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We develop and analyze an entry model that predicts that the likelihood that foreign firms 
enter a country increases with the productivity gap between foreign and domestic firms. The 
intuition is that foreign firms locate where their competitive advantage is highest and thus 
enter countries where their productivity is higher relative to domestic firms. We test this 
model using firm level data on acquisitions of British firms by foreign firms and find results 
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We explore a link between the productivity advantage that Multinationals (MNCs) have over domestic 
firms in host countries and their location decisions that has not been explored at either the theoretical 
or empirical level. Our argument is that productivity differences directly influence the decision of foreign 
firms to enter new markets, because post-entry profitability will generally depend on the ability of 
domestic firms to compete with foreign firms. This ability, which is commonly known in the literature on 
technology diffusion as ‘absorptive capacity’, determines the extent to which technology transfer can 
take place. It then follows that the decision of MNCs to enter a foreign market must depend, among 
other things, on the costs that domestic firms must incur to bridge the technology gap. The theoretical 
literature on MNCs entry models has not explicitly considered this relationship since in general 
theoretical work on the link between the technology gap and technology transfer has been conducted 
within non-strategic frameworks. 
 
We first present a stylised model of entry to foreign markets to examine how the strategic decisions of 
MNCs about where to locate can depend on their technology advantage. The novel feature of our 
model is the introduction of a ‘quality ladder’ in a standard two-firm model of entry. Our model predicts 
that the likelihood that a foreign firm enters increases with the technology gap. In addition, it also 
predicts that given entry the likelihood that the foreign firm dominates the market also increases with 
the productivity gap. We test the main prediction of our model using firm level data on the acquisition of 
domestically owned firms by foreign firms in the UK manufacturing sector for the period 1988 to 1996. 
We have found results that are consistent with our model’s predictions. 
 
 1. Introduction 
It is well documented that, in both developing and developed economies, there exists a 
‘productivity gap’ between foreign-owned and domestic firms.
1 In fact, it is exactly 
because of this productivity advantage that many governments of developing nations offer 
incentives to multinationals (MNCs) to invest in their countries.
2  Their hope is that 
assimilation of foreign technologies will boost domestic productivity and hence economic 
development. But policies aimed at promoting FDI are not limited to developing countries. 
They are also common in developed economies where incentive packages often target the 
attraction of FDI in particular regions.  Thus, the desire for national or regional 
development provides one link between the ‘productivity gap’ and location of MNCs. 
In this paper, we explore a second link, associated with strategic location decisions 
of MNCs that has not been explored at either the theoretical or empirical level. Our 
argument is that productivity differences directly influence the decision of foreign firms to 
enter new markets, because post-entry profitability will generally depend on the ability of 
domestic firms to compete with foreign firms. This ability, which is commonly known in 
the literature on technology diffusion as ‘absorptive capacity’, determines the extent to 
which technology transfer can take place.
3 It then follows that the decision of MNCs to 
enter a foreign market must depend, among other things, on the costs that domestic firms 
must incur to bridge the technology gap. The theoretical literature on MNCs entry models 
has not explicitly considered this relationship since in general theoretical work on the link 
between the technology gap and technology transfer has been conducted within non-
strategic frameworks.
4
Our paper is motivated by the abundance of evidence that suggests that the relative 
presence of foreign firms differs considerably across industries; see for example Tables 1 
and 2 which show employment shares of MNCs across industries in the manufacturing 
sector for the United Kingdom and United States, respectively. How can we explain this 
variation? 
[Please insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Criscuolo and Martin (2005), Davies and Lyons (1991), Doms and Jensen (1998), Griffith 
(1999), and Lipsey and Sjoholm (2002). 
2 See Blonigen (2005) for a review of the determinants of FDI that includes a number of policy variables. 
3 This literature is vast and is extensively reviewed by Keller (2004).  
4Below, we review both of these literatures. 
  1We first present a stylised model of entry to foreign markets to examine how the 
strategic decisions of MNCs about where to locate can depend on their technology 
advantage. We keep the theory simple by abstracting from other issues related to entry in 
foreign markets and only use it to provide guidance for our empirical work. With that in 
mind, we analyze a market that is initially serviced by a domestic firm. A foreign firm with 
a superior technology, captured by a product that is higher in the ‘quality ladder’ relative to 
that provided by the domestic firm, considers whether to enter. If the foreign firm enters, 
the domestic firm will have to incur some cost to upgrade the quality of its product. To 
keep things simple, we assume that entry of the new product implies that demand for the 
old one vanishes. Then, conditional on the decisions of both firms, there are three possible 
market outcomes: a domestic monopoly, a foreign monopoly or a duopoly.  
The novel feature of our model is the introduction of a ‘quality ladder’ in a standard 
two-firm model of entry. The strand of the vast theoretical literature on MNC entry that is 
most closely related to our work examines the emergence of equilibrium market structures 
in oligopolistic international environments (Horstman and Markusen, 1992; Rowthorn, 
1992; Petit and Sanna-Randaccio, 2000). The same basic framework has also been used for 
the analysis of the decision of foreign firms between foreign direct investment and 
acquisitions (Hennart and Park, 1993; Smarzynska, 2000; Mueller, 2001; Ferret, 2003; 
Eicher and Kang, 2005). All these papers consider more complex market environments than 
ours but do not allow for goods of different qualities. Product quality competition has been 
explicitly considered in models of North-South trade (Flam and Helpman, 1987; Stokey, 
1991, Glass, 1997; Glass and Saggi, 1998). In contrast to our work, these models derive the 
technology gap endogenously but abstract from strategic entry decisions.  
Our model predicts that the likelihood that a foreign firm enters increases with the 
technology gap. In addition, it also predicts that given entry the likelihood that the foreign 
firm dominates the market also increases with the productivity gap. We need to be careful 
about how to interpret these predictions for markets where, first, there is more than one 
domestic firm and more than one foreign firm and, second, firms with different levels of 
technology co-exist. To address the first issue we would need to allow sequential entry in a 
multi-firm market which is beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, our 
duopoly model allows us to derive the following implication: when there are many firms 
there must be a positive correlation between the relative concentration of foreign firms in 
the market and the technology gap. Note that if the latter did not persist after entry, as we 
have assumed, we would not be able to observe it in the first place. The very fact that it 
  2persists implies a degree of product differentiation that allows different qualities to co-exist. 
Because we do not allow for product differentiation we have to assume there is only one 
equilibrium quality.  
  We test the main prediction of our model using firm level data on the acquisition of 
domestically owned firms by foreign firms in the UK manufacturing sector for the period 
1988 to 1996. Since our theoretical model is about greenfield investment rather than 
acquisitions we need to be careful in the interpretation of our test results.
5  That said, the 
main prediction of our model is independent of entry mode. That is we still expect foreign 
firms to enter when the productivity gap between them and domestic firms is high. We 
would also expect foreign firms to target the best firms and this is exactly what the data 
suggests.    
In the following section we develop and analyze our theoretical model. In section 3 
we present the empirical analysis and we conclude in the final section.  
 
2. The Model 
Consider a market for a product defined by its quality,  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ q , where quality not only 
reflects a firm’s level of technology but also the quality of its resources and ability and 
readiness to commit resources for R&D for quality upgrading. Initially, a domestic firm 
serves the domestic market at product quality m. A foreign firm with the ability to produce 
a higher quality n decides whether or not to enter the domestic market. To keep things 
simple, we assume that the introduction of a higher quality product drives out of the market 
the old lower quality one. If both firms decide to compete at the higher quality they will 
engage in Cournot competition. 
We assume that demand for the product is linear: 
P q A X − = ) (        
where X denotes total demand for the product, P denotes its price. In order to capture the 
effect of a change in quality on demand, we assume that the vertical intercept is an 
increasing function of quality;  .   0 ) ( ' > q A
  On the supply side, we assume both firms hire workers from the domestic 
(competitive) labour market. The domestic firm’s unit cost of production, w(q), is 
                                                 
5 Actually, our data is about Brownfield investment which refers to acquisitions where the foreign firm is 
dominant. 
  3increasing in the quality of the product, reflecting the cost of training workers to use more 
advanced technologies;  . In addition, if the domestic firm decides to compete in a 
higher quality product market it will face a fixed cost 
0 ) ( ' > q w
) ( m n C − . This is incurred by 
expenditure on R&D aimed at upgrading the technology so that it catches up with that 
employed by the foreign firm. We assume this increases at an increasing rate with the gap 
between the two technologies;   and  .   0 '> C 0 ' ' > C
  The foreign firm faces a fixed cost, F, before entering the domestic market. This 
captures expenditure associated with the establishment of a new plant. We also allow its 
unit cost to differ from the domestic firm’s corresponding cost for a number of reasons. For 
example, managers of the foreign firm might find that cultural differences between them 
and domestic workers imply a higher unit cost relative to the domestic firm. By contrast, it 
may cost less to train workers so they can cope with more advanced production 
technologies as the foreign firm already possesses the knowledge to do so. Then let 
 denote the ratio of the foreign firm’s unit cost divided by that of the domestic 
firm.  
) ( m n f −
 
We are now ready to solve the model. Denote by  f π  and   the profits and output level of 
the foreign firm given that it enters and by 
f x
d π  and   the profits and output level of the 
domestic firm given that it decides to compete at the higher quality n: 
d x
   ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( m n C x n w x x x n a d d f d d − − − − − = π     
   ( ) f f f d f x m n f n w x x x n a ) ( ) ( ) ( − − − − = π       
Note that the fixed cost F does not appear in the foreign firm’s profit function because it is 
a sunk cost. Solving the system of the two reaction functions derived by the maximization 
of the two profit functions yields the following equilibrium output levels: 
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Total Cournot output,  , is given by:  C X
   ( )
3
) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 2 * * m n f n w n A
x x X f d C
− + −
= + ≡  
  4and the Cournot price,  , is equal to:  C P
   ( )
3
) ( 1 ) ( ) (
) (
m n f n w n A
X n A P C C
− + +
= − ≡  
After substituting the above solutions back into the two profit functions we derive the 
following two equilibrium profit levels: 
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3
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m n f π    (2) 
2.1. Taxonomy of equilibria 
Equilibrium conditions (1) and (2) imply three possible scenarios: 
i  MULTINATIONAL MONOPOLY: If  , the domestic firm would make 
negative profits and therefore exit the market. This should be the case when the product 
quality introduced by the multinational firm is too advanced in comparison with the initial 
quality level of the domestic firm, which implies that the cost of upgrading, 
0
* < d π
) ( m n C − , 
exceeds the domestic firm’s revenues. In this case,  , becomes irrelevant and the 
foreign firm becomes a monopoly, as long as its monopoly profit is positive. 
F f −
* π
 ii  COURNOT COMPETITION: If  and  , both firms will make 
positive profits in the high quality market. This represents the case where the new product 
quality is such that it is not too costly for the domestic firm to invest resources so it can 
upgrade product quality and it is also profitable for the foreign firm to enter the market. 
0
* > d π 0
* > − F f π
 iii  DOMESTIC MONOPOLY: If  and  , the foreign firm will not 
enter the market as its technological advantage over the domestic firm is not sufficiently 
strong to allow it to make positive profits. The absence of FDI in this case implies that the 
domestic firm will keep producing at the low quality level m. 
0
* > d π 0
* < − F f π
  In the remainder of this section, we identify the conditions under which each will 
prevail. Let   denote the level of profits given that 
−
* π m n = .
6 Then we have that 
                                                 
6 Notice that in this limiting case (1) and (2) are equal. 
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It is clear that   is increasing in n. Now, denote by   the level of technology such that 
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. In order to limit our 
attention to the more interesting cases we make the following assumptions:  
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m n f π
.
7  
Assumption 2: There exist two real numbers   and   in the unit interval such that 
 and  .
* n
* m
0 ) , 1 (
* * = m d π 0 ) 0 , (
* * = n d π
8
The following result identifies combinations of technological levels for the two firms such 
that the foreign firm would not break even under Cournot competition.   
Result 1: For every m then for every  there exists a real number  such that for 
any  the foreign firm’s Cournot profits net of entry costs are negative. For   
the foreign firm’s corresponding profits are positive. 
−
< n n ) (n m
) (n m m >
−
> n n
The result follows directly from Assumption 1 and the fact that   is increasing in n. It 
implies that there exists a real number in the unit interval,  , such that  . 
The function   together with all the above mentioned cut-offs is depicted in Figure 1. 
Notice that along the diagonal the technology gap vanishes while it increases as we move in 







n 0 ) 0 , (
~
* = − F n f π
) (n m
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
                                                 
7 We argue that these assumptions identify the most plausible case. For example, they will hold when the 
premium  is relatively low. Anyway, in the following section, where we analyze the predictions of 
our model we also address alternative restrictions. 
) ( m n f −
8 The first condition states that given that the foreign firm’s technological level is at the highest possible level, 
there exists a level for the domestic firm’s initial quality such that at any lower level ( ) the domestic 
firm’s profit are negative. The second condition states that if the domestic firm’s initial quality is at the lowest 
possible level, there exists a cut-off level of quality such that at any higher level produced by the foreign firm 
( ) the domestic firm’s profits are negative. 
* m m <
* n n >
  6  The following result establishes conditions for the foreign firm to become a 
monopoly. 
Result 2: For every  there exists a real number   such that for every  , 
the foreign firm enters the market as a monopoly. 
* m m < ) (m n ) (m n n >
The result is a direct consequence of Assumption 2. The function  and the new cut-offs 
are also depicted in Figure 1. Notice that Figure 1 is drawn under the supposition that 
. In this case, for all combinations of technology levels for the two firms that lie to 
the left of the   locus the foreign firm does not enter the market.  For all such 
technology level pairs that lie to the right of the  locus the domestic firm exits the 
market and for pairs in between the two loci we have Cournot competition. The following 
result addresses the case where   which is depicted in Figure 2. Notice that in that 
case the two loci intersect. 
) (m n
~




* n n <
Result 3: If   then for all technology level pairs that lie to the right of the  locus 
and to the left of the  locus there is predation. 
~
* n n < ) (m n
) (n m
[Please insert Figure 2 about here] 
Result 1 implies that to the left of the   locus the foreign firm’s net of entry cost 
Cournot profits are negative. However, if the foreign firm enters Result 2 implies that the 
domestic firm will exit the market. Thus, the foreign firm commits by incurring the fixed 
entry cost and becomes a monopoly. The technology level pairs that lead to predation lie in 
the area of Figure 2 denoted PR.  
) (n m
2.2. The technology gap and market structure 
The main prediction of our model is: 
P1. There is a positive relationship between the technology gap and the relative  
      presence of multinationals in the domestic market. 
In addition, our model suggests that when testing the above prediction we must control for 
the following observation: 
P2. The presence of multinationals is positively related to the overall profitability    
      of the industry. 
 
  73. Evidence from Foreign Acquisitions 
In this section, we test the theoretical prediction that the probability of entry by 
foreign firms is increasing with their productivity advantage over domestic firms.
 9 We test 
this using data on the acquisition of domestically owned firms by foreign owned firms in 
the UK manufacturing sector for the period 1988 to 1996. What matters in the case of entry 
via an acquisition is not the productivity of the entrant but the productivity of the new firm 
created by the merger.  
To investigate the effects of firm and industry-level variables on the probability of 
acquisition we estimate the following probit model  
) , ( ) 1 ( 1 jt it ijt Z X F ACQ P − = =  
where i denotes firms, j industries and t time. To control for the effect on the standard errors 
from the repeated observation of variables on micro units (Moulton, 1990) we report firm 
clustered standard errors.  The vector X consists of a set of potentially important firm level 
controls and Z are industry level variables. We begin with a description of the data detailing 
acquisition of UK firms as well as the variables included in the vector X.   
3.1. Firm Data 
Detailed information on firms’ characteristics are taken from the OneSource database, 
which includes information on all UK public limited companies, all companies with 
employees greater than 50, and the top companies based on turnover, net worth, total assets, 
or shareholders funds (whichever is largest) in both manufacturing and service industries. 
Companies that are dissolved or are in the process of liquidation are excluded from the 
OneSource sample.
10  Here, we concentrate on manufacturing firms. 
OneSource provides information on employment, physical capital, output and cost 
of goods sold in a consistent way both across firms and across time. Nominal aggregates 
were deflated using five-digit level industry deflators. The data were then screened to select 
those manufacturing firms for which there is a complete set of information about the value 
of output and factors of production. 
Each edition of OneSource contains foreign-ownership indicators for the latest year 
only, so that it is not possible to identify when a firm became a subsidiary of a foreign 
multinational. To track the dynamics of ownership, we matched the population of 
                                                 
9 This data has been previously used by Girma et al. (2007 a,b) to examine the productivity and exporting 
performance of acquired firms against a set of matched counterparts. 
10 For this study we used the OneSource CD-ROM entitled “UK companies, Vol. 1”, for October 2000. 
  8manufacturing firms in the database to a list of U.K. firms acquired by foreign 
multinationals using data from the ONS.
11  In Table 1 we report the number of domestic 
companies acquired by foreign multinationals by year. While there are noticeable 
differences across years there appear few obvious patterns to the rate of foreign acquisition.  
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
To control for the characteristics of the acquired firm we draw on the results 
reported in Girma et al. (2007a,b). There the probability of acquisition depends upon size 
(measured by employment), size squared, age, average wage, a measure of labour 
productivity and the export status of the firm. We use the same firm controls in the 
regressions reported here. 
3.2. Relative Productivity Gap 
The key variable within the empirical model is a measure of the productivity gap between 
foreign and domestic firms. The productivity of the domestic firm is measured as the mean 
of all domestic firms within a given (3-digit) industry and year. The next choice is the 
productivity of foreign firms. Girma et al. (2007) demonstrate using the same dataset that 
the productivity of acquired firms improves relative to matched domestically-owned 
counterparts. This raises the possibility that the current productivity of the firm, which is 
observable, is a poor proxy for the productivity of the foreign owned firm in its home 
market and therefore of the productivity potential of the acquired firm.  Given the 
productivity improvement identified by Girma et al. (2007), this would suggest that using 
the current productivity of the acquired firm would tend to underestimate the size of the 
productivity gap hypothesised in the model, although we continue to control for the 
productivity of the acquired firm amongst the control variables. Given the ex-ante 
uncertainty that is likely to exist regarding the extent of the productivity improvement that 
would be realised by the foreign firm following acquisition we use a measure of 
productivity potential that is common to all firms, the maximum TFP of foreign owned 
firms, in each 3-digit SIC industry and year.   
The productivity gap is measured as the log ratio of the maximum TFP of foreign 
firms to the average domestic firm. Our theoretical model predicts that the relationship 
between this ratio and the probability of entry is positive. To capture the likelihood 
acquisition may take place over long periods of time we lag this variable twice  Given some 
                                                 
11 This information which is in hard copy format is obtained from the Office of National Statistics upon 
special request. 
  9of the strong assumptions used in constructing this measure we test its robustness to the use 
of alternative measures for the productivity gap between domestic and foreign firms.  
3.3. Other Control variables 
Entry into a given industry into the UK is likely to be more common in industries in which 
the UK is relatively more successful. This suggests that the extent of foreign ownership is 
likely to be an important determinant of entry by new foreign firms for reasons in addition 
to the strategic ones suggested by our model (prediction P2).  The measure of the 
productivity gap we use varies across industries but varies little across time. This limits our 
ability to control for other potentially important industry level variables through the use of 
time invariant industry fixed effects in the standard way. For that reason we attempt to 
control a large number of other factors that might influence the likelihood of acquisition. 
These include measures of the extent of existing foreign ownership, international trade and 
the technology intensity of the sector.  
To capture the current stock of FDI we use a measure of the share of foreign in total 
industry output used previously by Girma, Görg and Pisu (2007) to measure FDI spillovers, 
as well as a count of the number of foreign firms relative to domestic firms. It might also 
seem likely that rates of acquisition are higher in industries that the UK is relatively 
successful at exporting, because this reflects some comparative advantage of the UK 
(Yeaple, 2003) or sheltered from international competition, so that FDI substitutes for 
current export activity by the foreign multinational (see for example the model by Buckley 
and Casson, 1981). Alongside measures of total export trade, the extent of foreign 
competition through imports (import penetration), and the nature of the product, using a 
measure of intra-industry trade, we also separate the FDI variable according to the share of 
total exports controlled by foreign multinational firms. This controls for the use of the UK 
as an export platform, as set out for example in Motta and Norman (1996).  
Our final set of industry variables includes a measure of R&D to total sales, to 
control for the technological intensity of the sector if technology sourcing motives to FDI 
are important.
12  We also include in the regression a measure of the Herfindahl index of 
industry concentration, which may help capture other aspects of the strategic motives of 
acquisition, and of industry agglomeration from Duranton and Overmans (2005). These 
data, previously used by Greenaway and Kneller (2008), are from the OECD, with the trade 
variables constructed at the 3 or 4 digit level. Finally, to control for the effect of factors 
                                                 
12 To avoid conflating acquired firms in these measures all are lagged one period. 
  10such as exchange rates, taxes and institutions that are common across UK manufacturing 
industries but which may vary across time and may influence the timing of foreign 
acquisition (Blonigen, 2005) we include a full set of time dummies. 
 
3.4. Results 
In Table 4 we report results from our base specification. Those for the control variables 
match many of those reported in Girma et al. (2007a,b). The probability of acquisition is 
increasing in the size of the firm and labour productivity and decreasing in firm age. 
Current export status, which is correlated with other aspects of firm performance in models 
such as Melitz (2003) has no residual impact on the probability of acquisition. Taken 
together, it would appear that foreign firms cherry-pick the best domestic firms to acquire.  
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
Of the industry control variables a number enter the regression with statistically 
significant coefficients. Acquisition is more likely for example in industries where foreign 
firms account for a higher share of employment, contrary to the view that export-platform 
motives are important in a UK context, where rates of import penetration are high and 
exports are low. We also find that agglomeration factors might be important, acquisition is 
more likely in industries that are more agglomerated according to the Duranton and 
Overmans (2005) measure. 
Of interest to this study we also find that the probability of foreign acquisition is 
increasing with the productivity gap between foreign firms and the average domestic firm at 
standard significance levels. That is the productivity gap measure suggested by our 
theoretical model. The reported effects are marginal effects estimated at the mean of the 
right hand side variables. The coefficients suggest that the size of this effect is around 1/3
rd 
of that of the observed probability of acquisition. 
In columns two to four we test the robustness of this result to the measure of the 
productivity potential of foreign firms. In column two we use the foreign firm that lies at 
the 95
th percentile of the productivity distribution; column three replaces this with the 
foreign firm at the 90
th percentile; column four the productivity of the average foreign firm; 
and column five with the median rather than the mean domestic firm.  
There is some sensitivity to this choice. In columns two, three and five the main 
result holds, entry is more likely in industries in which the gap to the average domestic firm 
is greater, where this result is robust to measuring the productivity of the foreign firm down 
  11to the 90
th percentile and to minimise the effect of possible outliers in the data, to 
measuring domestic firms with the median. When the productivity potential of foreign 
firms is measured using the average productivity of foreign firms within the industry the 
result no longer holds however.
13 The effect appears specific to the gap to the best foreign 
firms as suggested by our theoretical model.  
A key assumption in generating the productivity gap variable is that the productivity 
of the foreign firm is captured by the productivity of those foreign firms that lie on the 
technical frontier within the industry. The idea is that these firms compare themselves with 
firms that face similar constraints. An alternative assumption would be that foreign firms 
benchmark themselves against the best firms within the industry, rather than just the best 
foreign firms. In Table 5 we therefore measure the productivity gap between the average 
domestic firm and frontier firm (whether domestic or foreign). It would appear that the 
assumption used in generating the original variable has support. The productivity gap to the 
frontier, while positive, is not statistically significant using this measure. Thus, it is the 
foreign aspect that is important.  
In column two we then replace this variable with the gap between the best foreign 
and best domestic firm. This variable enters the regression with a significant coefficient, 
although the productivity gap to the average domestic firm remains unaffected by its 
inclusion.  
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
In column three we investigate whether the relative productivity gap is something 
that is specific to the determinants of entry of foreign firms as suggested by our model. If 
the gap also determines acquisitions by domestic firms, for example, it may be more likely 
we have neglected some aspect of the acquisition process that is correlated with this 
variable. With that in mind we also examine the impact of the gap on acquisitions of 
domestic firms by other domestic firms. The data for domestic-to-domestic acquisitions are 
again from ONS. The results from this regression are striking. Of the industry variables we 
find that acquisition is more likely in industries in which foreign firms account for a greater 
share of domestic output but not by the relative productivity gap between the average 
domestic firm and frontier foreign firm. 
In the next three columns of Table 5 we again replace our measure of the 
productivity gap with another aspect of the productivity distribution. In column three we 
                                                 
13 We find that the effect of the productivity gap remains significant when measured by the foreign firm that 
lies at the 85
th percentile (t-statistic 1.72) but not the 80
th percentile (t-statistics 1.30). 
  12test whether it captures diversity of productivity levels between domestic firms using a 
measure of the standard deviation, and in column four whether it has anything to do with 
the skewness of the distribution. In both cases the answer would appear to be no.   
Thus far we have been measuring productivity as labour productivity. This in part 
reflects a desire to capture aspects of multinational firm performance reflected in physical 
and human capital. As a final exercise we test the robustness of our findings to the use of a 
measure of total factor productivity, and employ four measures of TFP constructed by 
Girma at al (2007). The first is constructed using the index number (i.e. non-parametric) 
approach (Caves, et al, 1982a, b; Good et al, 1997) and has been previously employed 
amongst others by Aw et al (2000) and Delgado et al (2001).  The principle advantage of 
using this measure over alternatives, such as the econometric estimation of the production 
function, is that it allows the comparison of productivity growth rates and levels between 
firms over time.  The second and third measures are based on the residuals from a 
production function estimated by generalised least squares and with an AR(1) error term. 
The second measure assumes that the production function is Cobb-Douglas and the third 
that it is translog. Further details on these measures can be found in Girma et al. (2007a).  
The relative TFP measure between foreign and domestic firms is then constructed in the 
same manner as before. 
As can be seen from Table 6 the results are robust to the use of these various 
measures of TFP. In each case the technology gap variable enters the regression with the 
expected significant coefficients, which occurs despite the insignificance of the firm level 
measure of TFP in the same regression. It would appear that even when using a narrower 
description of the advantage that foreign firms might possess relative to domestic firms it 
remains an important influence over the likelihood of entry into UK manufacturing through 
acquisition FDI. 
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4. Concluding Comments 
The relative presence of multinationals (measured either by number of firms or by output 
volume) varies considerably from industry to industry. The productivity gap between 
foreign and domestic firms also exhibits great variability across industries. In this paper, we 
have developed a simple entry model that predicts that these two variations will be 
positively correlated. The intuition is that foreign firms locate where their competitive 
  13advantage is highest and thus enter countries where their productivity is higher relative to 
domestic firms. We have tested our model using firm data on acquisitions of British firms 
by foreign firms and have found results that are consistent with our model’s predictions. 
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Table 1: Share of foreign employment, by industry; United Kingdom, 1992 
Extraction and preparation of metalliferous  ores     0.00 
Metal  manufacturing         0.19 
Extraction of Minerals not elsewhere specified        0.00 
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products        0.13 
Chemical  industry         0.38 
Production  of  man-made  fibres       0.20 
Manufacture of metal goods not elsewhere  specified     0.19 
Mechanical  engineering        0.28 
Manufacture of office machinery and data processing equipment     0.68  
Electrical  and  electronic  engineering       0.31 
Manufacture of motor vehicles and  parts  thereof     0.48 
Manufacture of other transport equipment          0.11 
Instrumental  engineering        0.29 
Food and drink manufacturing industries
1      0.09 
Food and drink and tobacco manufacturing industries
2    0.25 
Textile  industry         0.08 
Manufacture of leather and leather  goods      0.00 
Footwear  and  clothing  industries       0.06 
Timber and wooden furniture industries          0.06 
Manufacture of paper and paper products; printing and publishing    0.22 
Processing  of  rubber  and  plastics       0.28 
Other  manufacturing  industries       0.13 
__________ 
1 Oils, margarines, milk products; freezing, processing and preserving of meat, fish, fruit and vegetables; 
grain milling, bread and flour confectionery. 
2 Sugar and sugar confectionery, cocoa, coffee, tea, animal feeds and pet foods, and all others 
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Table 2: Share of foreign employment, by industry; United States, 1996 
Food  and  kindred  products        0.10 
Textile  mill  products         0.07 
Apparel  and  other  textile        0.05 
Wood  and  furniture         0.02 
P a p e r            0 . 0 9  
Printing  and  publishing        0.07 
C h e m i c a l s           0 . 3 1  
Rubber  and  plastic         0.15 
Stone,  glass  and  mineral        0.22 
P r i m a r y   m e t a l s         0 . 1 4  
F a b r i c a t e d   m e t a l s          0 . 0 9  
Industrial  Machines         0.11 
E l e c t r o n i c s           0 . 1 9  
M o t o r   v e h i c l e s         0 . 1 5  
Other  transport        0.04 
I n s t r u m e n t s           0 . 1 3  
__________ 
Source: Keller and Yeaple (2003). 
  16 































  17Table 4: Probit Model of Foreign Acquisition 
  1  2 3 4 5 








  Firm  Variables     
Log(labour   0.007  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
productivity) t-1 (3.31)***  (3.32)*** (3.32)*** (3.37)*** (3.35)*** 
Log(emp) t-1 0.002  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (2.81)***  (2.81)*** (2.80)*** (2.78)*** (2.88)*** 
Age t-1 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (2.38)**  (2.38)** (2.38)** (2.36)** (2.30)** 
Export   0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dummyt-1 (0.09)  (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) 
        
 Industry  Variables     
Productivity   0.005  0.005 0.005 0.003 0.007 
Gap t-1 (2.36)**  (2.25)**  (2.00)** (1.23) (2.34)** 
        
Foreign   0.017  0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 
Emp. Share t-1 (3.96)***  (3.95)*** (3.93)*** (3.91)*** (3.85)*** 
Relative No.   15.144  16.035 17.399 20.214 -1.119 
Firms t-1 (0.61)  (0.64) (0.70) (0.83) (0.08) 
Share foreign 
output 
-0.016  -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.019 
exported  (0.72)  (0.74) (0.74) (0.71) (0.86) 
Share foreign 
output 
0.001  0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.000 
domestic  (0.07)  (0.09) (0.20) (0.41) (0.03) 
Total Exports  -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (2.10)**  (2.09)**  (2.09)** (1.91)* (2.01)** 
Intra-industry  0.008  0.008 0.009 0.010 0.007 
Trade  (1.01)  (1.06) (1.19) (1.35) (0.89) 
Import  0.041  0.041 0.042 0.041 0.031 
Penetration   (2.51)**  (2.52)** (2.55)** (2.44)**  (1.94)* 
R&D intensity  -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (1.54)  (1.56)  (1.61) (1.66)* (1.15) 
Herfindahl  0.039  0.039 0.038 0.037 0.041 
Index  (4.41)***  (4.40)*** (4.34)*** (4.27)*** (4.82)*** 
Industry  -0.051  -0.052 -0.053 -0.054 -0.056 
Agglomeration   (1.71)*  (1.73)* (1.77)* (1.76)* (1.87)* 
Observations  10323  10323 10323 10323 10327 
Notes:   
(i)  Effects are estimated marginal effects at the industry mean 
(ii)  Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust t-statistics in parentheses 
(iii)  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at1% 
(iv)  All specifications include year dummies 
(v)  All regressions use firm clustered standard errors. 
  18Table 5: Probit Model of Foreign Acquisition: Robustness 
  1  2 3 4 5 











  Firm  Variables     
Log(labour   0.009  0.007 0.003 0.009 0.009 
productivity) t-1 (4.04)*** (3.30)***  (2.56)**  (3.73)***  (3.74)*** 
Log(emp) t-1 0.002 0.002  -0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (2.73)***  (2.90)*** (3.59)*** (2.64)*** (2.66)*** 
Age t-1 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (2.14)**  (2.37)** (2.41)** (2.12)** (2.12)** 
Export   0.002 0.000  -0.002  0.001  0.001 
Dummyt-1 (0.85)  (0.16) (1.12) (0.19) (0.23) 
        
 Industry  Variables     
Productivity   0.004 0.009  -0.000     
Gap t-1 (1.38) (2.98)***  (0.04)     
        
Foreign Max -    -0.005     
Domestic Max    (1.91)+     
Standard        -0.005   
Deviation LP       (1.17)  
Skew LP         0.000 
         (0.13) 
Foreign   0.021  0.016 0.018 0.021 0.021 
Emp. Share t-1 (4.27)***  (3.93)*** (3.27)*** (4.70)*** (4.68)*** 
Relative No.   -6.366 12.175  -8.376  54.749  60.310 
Firms t-1 (0.20) (0.49)  (0.34)  (1.55)  (1.72)* 
Share foreign 
output 
-0.030  -0.021  0.007 0.003 0.002 
exported  (1.21)  (0.93) (0.35) (0.11) (0.07) 
Share foreign 
output 
0.001 0.003  -0.015  0.009  0.008 
domestic  (0.05)  (0.27) (1.64) (0.75) (0.68) 
Total Exports  -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (2.35)**  (2.39)**  (0.23) (0.97) (1.07) 
Intra-industry  0.002  0.007 0.001 0.013 0.014 
Trade  (0.29)  (0.98) (0.24) (1.59) (1.60) 
Import  0.059 0.046  -0.010  0.037  0.035 
Penetration   (3.10)*** (2.70)***  (0.84)  (1.79)*  (1.72)* 
R&D intensity  -0.001 -0.001  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
  (1.63) (1.60)  (0.93) (2.03)** (1.93)* 
Herfindahl  0.045  0.042 0.013 0.019 0.019 
Index  (4.49)***  (4.67)***  (1.87)* (1.70)* (1.67)* 
Industry  -0.070  -0.061 -0.040 -0.052 -0.053 
Agglomeration   (2.16)** (2.06)**  (1.99)**  (1.65)*  (1.66)* 
Observations  10649 10323  10322  8582  8582 
  19Table 6: Probit Model of Foreign Acquisition: Measures of TFP 
  1 2  3 
  TFP index  C-D TFP  Translog 
TFP 
  Firm  Variables   
Log(labour   0.003 0.002  0.004 
productivity) t-1 (0.42) (0.22)  (0.45) 
Log(emp) t-1 0.003 0.003  0.003 
  (2.70)** (2.31)*  (2.31)* 
Age t-1 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
  (3.92)** (3.62)**  (3.63)** 
Export   0.001 0.002  0.002 
Dummyt-1 (0.25) (0.65)  (0.64) 
      
 Industry  Variables   
Productivity   0.022 0.032  0.031 
Gap t-1 (2.49)* (3.29)**  (2.92)** 
      
Foreign   0.023 0.022  0.022 
Emp. Share t-1 (4.13)** (4.10)**  (4.04)** 
Relative No.   16.928 25.391  29.201 
Firms t-1 (0.40) (0.77)  (0.90) 
Share foreign 
output 
-0.020 -0.040  -0.033 
exported  (0.67) (1.32)  (1.12) 
Share foreign 
output 
0.006 0.004  0.007 
domestic  (0.45) (0.29)  (0.46) 
Total Exports  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
  (1.28) (1.34)  (1.35) 
Intra-industry  0.005 0.004  0.005 
Trade  (0.46) (0.38)  (0.46) 
Import  0.044 0.056  0.047 
Penetration   (2.05)* (2.41)*  (2.17)* 
R&D intensity  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 
  (1.67)+ (1.49)  (1.67)+ 
Herfindahl  0.044 0.045  0.045 
Index  (3.34)** (3.81)**  (3.80)** 
Industry  -0.040 -0.068  -0.067 
Agglomeration   (1.09) (1.84)+  (1.79)+ 
Observations  7463 7826  7826 
Notes:   
(i)  See notes to Table 4 
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Figure 2: Equilibria when   
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